

**Findings of the monitoring exercise on the
European Commission's Recommendation on
combating online piracy of sports and other live
events**

November 2025

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Background

The European Commission's Recommendation on combating online piracy of sports and other live events (4 May 2023, 'the Recommendation')⁽¹⁾ encourages 'Member States, national authorities, holders of rights and providers of intermediary services to take effective, appropriate, and proportionate measures to combat unauthorised retransmissions of live sports events and other live events'. The Recommendation's main focus is threefold:

- a prompt treatment of notices related to live events;
- the use of blocking injunctions tailored to live events;
- the increase of the awareness, availability, affordability and attractiveness of legal offers.

As part of its Recommendation, the Commission invited the EUIPO to **create a dedicated network of national authorities** involved in the fight against online piracy and to **monitor** the Recommendation's impact through a set of [key performance indicators](#) (KPIs).

The KPIs have been defined with the support of the EUIPO Observatory, following a consultation of the draft with holders of rights, providers of intermediary services ('intermediaries'), and public authorities. These stakeholders were invited to provide their feedback through three expert online workshops that took place in June 2023. The Commission then published the finalised KPIs in July 2023.

This document aims to provide the European Commission with the outcomes of the monitoring exercise.

The monitoring exercise lasted from the Recommendation's publication on 4 May 2023 to the end of August 2025, with the **data gathering period covering January 2024 to June 2025**. The data gathering was divided into **two main data collection exercises**. It was preceded by a **test data collection**, which is not part of the present document⁽²⁾.

- Test data collection: April 2024 – gathering of test data for the period January to March 2024 (not part of the present document). The aim was – for both the submitters and the EUIPO on the receiving end – to collect the first data, gather experience on the process and help to identify issues that could be improved. These were discussed with the Commission and participants – holders of rights through calls and Member States through the dedicated network – ahead of the next data collection.
- Data collection exercise I: January 2025 – gathering of data for the period January to December 2024.
- Data collection exercise II: July 2025 – gathering of data for the period January to June 2025.

Data on the **number of visits to websites providing access to unauthorised retransmission** of sports and other live events in EU Member States were provided by MUSO, a specialised data company (KPI 1). Data on the **prompt treatment of notices** related to live events (KPI 2), on the use of **dynamic injunctions** (KPI 3) and on **legal offers and awareness** (KPI 4) were gathered through KPI templates addressed to holders of rights, intermediaries and Member States (more information on the monitoring, the templates and data protection principles available from [EUIPO website](#)).

Data was considered also when templates were not followed, or information was submitted in a different format (e.g. PDF document). The data on the notices sent to intermediaries (KPI 2) was complemented by extensive '**raw data**', which was offered voluntarily by several holders of rights.

⁽¹⁾ [Commission Recommendation on combating online piracy of sports and other live events](#), C(2023) 2853 final, European Commission, 4 May 2023.

⁽²⁾ Unless stated – see footnote 39.

This document also integrates **additional information** gathered through studies, media monitoring or contacts with stakeholders, as well as through the dedicated network of national authorities created in the context of the Recommendation.

The monitoring exercise was characterised by an **uneven participation** from Member States and some stakeholders compared to others. Member States and holders of rights provided input based on KPIs, but there was a near absence of data from intermediaries⁽³⁾, despite repeated attempts from the EUIPO to encourage their submission⁽⁴⁾. However, some intermediaries have been constructively contributing with information through bilateral meetings or during the two conferences on live event piracy, taking place at the EUIPO. Some of the KPIs were only partially completed. Finally, a change in the anti-piracy strategy of one holder of rights resulted in a major increase of the total notices submitted to intermediaries (KPI 2). This made it difficult to compare and cross-check data from different groups of stakeholders, and between the data collecting periods (January to December 2024 and January to June 2025). However, the validity of the data was not disputed, but checked for inconsistency or errors in the use of the templates.

Meanwhile, the development of IPTV piracy presented a specific challenge for the monitoring exercise. The data provided by MUSO is a reference to capture the volume of web-based piracy for the needs of this document, but it has its limitations to measure IPTV piracy. The data covers the number of visits to websites offering access to piracy content, including IPTV piracy services. However, once a subscription to an IPTV service is concluded, the user does not necessarily need to visit such a website again to access the illegal IPTV service, as it usually happens through devices and apps. In addition, MUSO's data on access to piracy IPTV services does not differentiate between types of content pirated this way (i.e. live sports, television programmes, series, films).

This issue was identified early in the monitoring process and raised by holders of rights. However, for the time being, there is no easily available data source to reliably capture the level of IPTV piracy across the EU, and the breakdown on the different types of pirated content. As part of its 2024 report on online copyright infringement in the EU⁽⁵⁾, the EUIPO Observatory through various scenarios approximated the level and evolution of IPTV piracy based on existing data. This first attempt at measuring IPTV piracy and the corresponding simulations in the 2024 EUIPO report, reports from holders of rights⁽⁶⁾ as well as the number of cases leading to the takedown of major IPTV piracy service, indicate that this form a piracy is rising.

⁽³⁾ A representative of an intermediary service providers' association explained that preparing detailed information for KPIs would result in additional costs for their members. This may be a reason for the low participation. Nevertheless, one intermediary participated in the test period (January to March 2024) and another intermediary provided information mostly outside the relevant KPIs.

⁽⁴⁾ Through bi-lateral contacts and during the [first](#) (9-10 October 2023) and the [second](#) (20-21 April 2025) conferences on live event piracy (9-10 October 2023 and 20-21 April 2025).

⁽⁵⁾ [Online Copyright Infringement in the European Union, Films, Music, Publications, Software and TV \(2017-2023\)](#), the EUIPO.

⁽⁶⁾ According to data (outside the KPIs) from one sports event organiser, 40 % of online piracy sources came from IPTV (January to March 2025).

Executive summary

Period covered

- General information monitoring ⁽⁷⁾: May 2023 to August 2025.
- KPI data collection: January to December 2024 (first data gathering) and January to June 2025 (second data gathering) ⁽⁸⁾.

Participating stakeholders

	January to December 2024	January to June 2025
National authorities	16 submissions	14 submissions
Holders of rights	17 submissions	18 submissions
Intermediaries ⁽⁹⁾	-	1 submission

Main outcomes

KPI 1 – VOLUME OF UNAUTHORISED RETRANSMISSION OF SPORTS AND OTHER LIVE EVENTS IN MEMBER STATES

- Over the monitored period, the visits to piracy websites offering unauthorised retransmission of live sports events peaked in October 2023 with over 0.6 average monthly visits per internet user. Followed by a decline in 2024, it started to increase just before the beginning of 2025, and peaked in February-March 2025 with over 0.8 average monthly visits.
- The visits to such websites appear to be cyclical, with two annual peaks – around March-April and September-October – and lower levels in July. This could be linked to competitions and holiday seasons.
- In contrast, visits to piracy websites offering unauthorised retransmission of other live events peaked in June 2024 (with slightly above 0.1 monthly visits per internet user) and started to decline since. The reasons for this development could not be established. However, this had a small impact on overall live event piracy as the ratio between the number of visits to piracy sites for live sports is six times higher than for non-sports piracy sites.
- The analysis of the information provided by holders of rights and the simulations of IPTV-data (for overall piracy, not limited to live events) indicate that IPTV piracy is gaining in importance.
- Based on data outside the KPIs, a relevant overlap between digital content piracy and organised crime was noted. Enforcement activities at national level and cross-border level are increasingly targeting organised criminal piracy networks.

⁽⁷⁾ For example, studies, media monitoring or contacts with stakeholders.

⁽⁸⁾ Unless stated, the data from the test data gathering was not considered. This document also refers to additional information that has been collected pre- and post the KPI data-collection period.

⁽⁹⁾ One intermediary also participated during the test phase. See also footnote 39.

KPI 2 – ON THE PROMPT TREATMENT OF NOTICES RELATED TO UNAUTHORISED RETRANSMISSION OF LIVE SPORTS EVENTS AND OTHER LIVE EVENTS

According to the data received from holders of rights for January 2024 to June 2025:

- 27 318 940 notices were submitted to intermediaries, with around 11 % (3 105 072 notices) resulting in suspension of the unauthorised retransmission. Due to the limited participation of intermediaries in the data gathering exercise the reason for the low suspension rate could not be established. The suspension rate for online platforms was particularly high, reaching 96 %;
- a limited number of cooperation agreements to support the submission of notices were in place between holders of rights and intermediaries (hosting and non-hosting providers) – 6 % (1 546 011 notices) were submitted on the basis of such agreements;
- 47 % of the total of notices were addressed to dedicated server providers, and 42 % to intermediaries that could support the identification of the source of the unauthorised retransmission (e.g. content delivery networks);
- Holders of rights and some national authorities reverted to the increasing role or misuse of non-hosting intermediaries in live event piracy, such as content delivery networks and virtual private networks, and the need to address this issue at EU level.

KPI 3 – ON THE USE OF (DYNAMIC) INJUNCTIONS

According to data from national authorities for the period between January 2024 to June 2025:

- 2 966 injunctions addressing live event piracy that were granted by authorities in six Member States resulted in 77 262 blocked domains and IP addresses. Considering that, in the first half of 2025, 579 injunctions led to 35 542 blocked domain names or IP addresses, it is expected that the use and range of dynamic injunctions will likely increase by the end of 2025.
- The use of dynamic injunctions addressing live event piracy was mentioned by 13 Member States, although they may be available in more jurisdictions. In six of these Member States the national authority can issue injunctions or support the implementation of a court injunction, such as by updating the list of internet locations⁽¹⁰⁾. However, discussions to improve (e.g. to introduce an automated system for the implementation of blocking orders, including dynamic injunctions) or to introduce specific procedures for dynamic injunctions were taking place at national levels.
- National authorities reported on legal standing for sports event organisers being granted in four Member States, with one of them having introduced it in 2025. One Member State explained that the legal status needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Sports event organisers may also be holders of neighbouring or similar rights in certain Member States. Overall, it was challenging to classify the Member States' legal regimes in this regard.
- Two national authorities reported seven cases of wrongful or over blocking related to dynamic injunctions ⁽¹¹⁾.
- Safeguard measures to ensure the proportionality of the injunction are taken by the courts and administrative authorities, including the setting up of whitelists or the requirement for providers of intermediary services to timely unblock in case of error.
- The discussions within the dedicated network on over blocking were considered useful. National authorities particularly appreciated the possibility to exchange information on national approaches to fight live event piracy.

⁽¹⁰⁾ This data is not exhaustive and is based on information provided by some national authorities outside the KPI monitoring exercise.

⁽¹¹⁾ From the received data, it was not possible to assess the extent and long-term effects of each case of over blocking.

According to the data from holders of rights:

- eight holders of rights requested 4 263 orders and 88 % were granted⁽¹²⁾.
- For some jurisdictions, holders of rights reported on long administrative procedures and that dynamic injunctions were not available for blocking IP addresses (while they existed for domains-blocking).

KPI 4 – AVAILABILITY, AFFORDABILITY, ATTRACTIVENESS AND AWARENESS

- The limited data submitted under this KPI compared to the information requested did not allow to consider an evolution of the availability, affordability, attractiveness and awareness of commercial offers. Several sports event organisers explained that certain commercially sensitive information could not be provided, such as indicative pricing for access to content.
- The submitted data referred only to sports: six categories for sports event organisers, and ten categories for broadcasters.
- For sports event organisers, the main distribution channels were commercial (subscription-based/pay) broadcasters and platforms, but also included national broadcasters ('free-to-air'). For broadcasters, the reported distribution channels were limited to Pay TV or streaming services based on subscriptions.
- Regarding the awareness raising of legal offers, few initiatives were reported by holders of rights: two broadcasters mentioned advertising and marketing activities, the sports event organisers association and one sports event organiser referred to their respective website listing legal offers in Member States.
- National authorities used several means to raise awareness, including use of ads or banners, campaigns and educational training, and references to national portals that inform on legal offers. The Agorateka portal⁽¹³⁾, which was joined by Bulgaria in 2024, by Croatia and Slovenia in 2025, and contains the option to search for sports content, was mentioned several times.
- Obstacles faced by users to access the available legal offer of live content mentioned by national authorities were largely linked to pricing, limited number of licences to broadcasters, fragmentation of offer and to limited territorial access. Some holders of rights referred to the inherent costs of organising competitions.

⁽¹²⁾ There are several possible reasons for a discrepancy between the data on injunctions reported by national authorities and by holders of rights. First, holders of rights reported on injunctions submitted in jurisdictions which may not overlap with those of the reporting national authorities. Second, national authorities participating to the monitoring exercise may not be aware of all injunctions in their countries' jurisdictions.

⁽¹³⁾ See also Agorateka [website](#).

Summary of the findings

Several trends and challenges can be drawn from the analysis of the submitted KPI data.

1. Live event piracy persists and seems to be changing in nature. On top of web-based piracy, IPTV piracy seems to be a significant source. This puts additional strains and challenges on some existing measures to combat the unauthorised retransmission of live events, which had been designed for web-based piracy (e.g. domain name system blocking) and require adaptation to IPTV (e.g. IP blocking).
2. There seems to be room for improvement in processing and acting upon notices, as only a small percentage of the notices submitted resulted in successful stream suspensions. The volume of notices reflects the need for better cooperation among the addressees of the Recommendation, to ensure that intermediaries acting on such notice take down or block access to content in a timely manner.
3. Dynamic injunctions in the context of live events seem to be gaining traction as their use has slightly increased over the monitoring period. They remain unevenly implemented across Member States. The number of Member States granting legal standing to sports events organisers has slightly increased, but in most Member States they have to rely on neighbouring rights or contractual law.
4. The availability and attractiveness of legal offer seem to be an issue impacted by pricing, territorial limitations and fragmentation of the commercial offers, according to some Member States' authorities. Efforts to raise awareness through campaigns and platforms like Agorateka are growing.
5. Based on the feedback from participants, the dedicated network of national authorities was considered a relevant forum supporting information exchange. Discussions on national legislative developments and challenges of combating live event piracy, such as the implementation of blocking injunctions, were particularly well received. ⁽¹⁴⁾

⁽¹⁴⁾ The EUIPO intends to maintain the dedicated network possibly with a wider mandate on combating online piracy in general. See also Box 2: The dedicated network of national authorities.

MONITORING OF THE COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION ON COMBATING ONLINE PIRACY OF SPORTS AND OTHER LIVE EVENTS

Detailed analysis of the KPIs


1. KPI 1 – VOLUME OF UNAUTHORISED RETRANSMISSION OF SPORTS AND OTHER LIVE EVENTS IN MEMBER STATES

Data provided by MUSO.

1.1. Web-based piracy


This KPI is based on the data provided by the data company MUSO on the number of visits to pirate live events websites. The information is complemented by data from other sources.

Graph 1: Evolution of live events – sports – web-based piracy in the EU-27




Graph 1 focuses on visits to websites illegally offering access to live sports events – it shows two annual peaks – around March-April and September-October – and a low in July. The reasons for the peaks are not clear but they may be linked to specific sports competitions. The lows seem to correspond to the holiday season. The average of the recorded total piracy (average of the past 12 months – blue line), which allows for an easier observation of trends, has its highest value in July 2023 (with around 0.6 monthly visits per internet user). After a slight decline throughout 2024, it reached a comparable level to October 2023 in April 2025.

Graph 2: Evolution of live events – other than sports – web-based piracy in the EU-27



Graph 2 on visits to websites illegally offering access to live events other than sports shows a lower number of average monthly visits per internet user compared to live sports events, and an opposite trend. The visits to piracy websites start to rise from July 2023 and, after a peak in June 2024 (with slightly above 0.1 monthly visits per internet user), decline in the beginning of 2025. In the absence of data from holders of rights specific to events other than sports, the reason for such a trend could not be established.

Graph 3: Evolution of all live events – web-based piracy in the EU-27



Graph 3 represents visits to websites offering illegal access to all live events, and is congruent with Graph 1 on live sports events. While the average of the past 12 months (blue line) may indicate that web-based piracy of live events is stagnant (January 2023 to April 2025), it does not necessarily apply to live event piracy overall but may indicate an evolution from traditional web-based towards other types of piracy, particularly IPTV-based piracy. Beyond the blue line which shows the average of the past 12 months, peaks can be observed throughout the year (black line).

Mobile devices were used slightly more to access live event piracy content, accounting for around 53 % of total visits, compared to 47 % from desktop devices. In terms of the source of directed traffic towards piracy websites, the majority was sent via a direct URL address, accounting for around 56 %, followed by results on search engines with 26 % and by links from other domains (e.g. affiliates on websites) with 16 %.

1.2. IPTV-based piracy

MUSO also provided limited data for IPTV piracy⁽¹⁵⁾⁽¹⁶⁾, for which the methodology differs. IPTV piracy⁽¹⁷⁾ is not directly measured as is done for website piracy. The data corresponds to the number of visits to pirate IPTV registration websites that are used to sign up for IPTV services. The actual pirate IPTV consumption is not measured and remains unknown as it is not carried out through these websites, but through IP devices⁽¹⁸⁾.

Graph 4 presented below is not limited to sports but includes all kinds of content. It shows a continuous growth of visits to websites that provide registration to illicit IPTV services from 2023 to 2024. However, the first semester of 2025 shows a lower number of visits. Such a drop in 2025 should not be interpreted as a reduction in illegal IPTV due to a possible accumulation of existing users who may have registered and subscribed to IPTV services during previous visits. In addition, subscriptions to illegal IPTV services may happen through other channels, such as social media.

The simulations carried out under different scenarios and presented in the EUIPO's *Report on Online Copyright Infringement* suggests a growth in IPTV piracy and the number of total users⁽¹⁹⁾. The data in *Graph 4* shows clear lows over the summer and peaks over the autumn and winter months – it follows a similar pattern as in *Graphs 1, 2 and 3* (on the evolution of web-based piracy).

⁽¹⁵⁾ Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) refers to the delivery of television content over internet protocol networks. IPTV uses a technical internet protocol pairing between the source, a content distribution network and the destination device or app. Sometimes, these devices can be modified streaming devices, such as the [Amazon Fire TV Stick](#).


⁽¹⁶⁾ The data has been included in the EUIPO's report on [Online Copyright Infringement in the European Union, Films, Music, Publications, Software and TV \(2017-2023\)](#), EUIPO, November 2024.

⁽¹⁷⁾ IPTV piracy involves the illegal streaming of TV channels and on-demand content over managed networks, often mirroring the service quality of legitimate IPTV providers. Pirates may use sophisticated and organised business models to monetise their operations. IPTV piracy often does not rely on domain names, which is the case of 'IPTV-like' websites. Instead, it uses IPTV technology – streaming servers and other technical methods to deliver content directly to users, making it also harder to trace and shut down. As these illegal activities do not take place on the web, capturing data to accurately measure their scope and impact is a significant challenge.

⁽¹⁸⁾ The Live Content Coalition/SROC expressed criticism (see press release [here](#)) of the methodology used to measure IPTV piracy in the study on Online Copyright Infringement in the EU (2017-2023), claiming that it vastly underestimates the true magnitude of IPTV piracy, providing a wrong impression that situation is improving while in reality there was a likely substitution from web-based to IPTV-based piracy. The methodology used and its caveats relating to IPTV piracy were explained in this [study](#) (see p. 26), where the aim was to reflect on the evolution from traditional web-based towards other types of piracy (IPTV). For the time being, there is no easily available data source and therefore methodology to reliably capture: i) the level of IPTV piracy; and ii) the breakdown on the different types of content pirated this way (i.e. live sports, TV programmes, series, movies).

⁽¹⁹⁾ The number of users who sign up to these websites is unknown. Some will just visit the website and leave without registering. However, others will register and access illegal IPTV services. Therefore, there will be a cumulative effect, month after month, which will keep increasing the number of pirate IPTV users.

Graph 4: Evolution of visits to websites for illegal IPTV registration in the EU-27 (2023-2025)



Additional information beyond KPIs: the growth of illegal IPTV also corresponds to data and reporting from national authorities and several holders of rights⁽²⁰⁾.

1.3. Additional information beyond KPIs: Enforcement activities

Under EUIPO enforcement activities, the Observatory is also following important anti-piracy operations taking down major IPTV networks, and is looking at other related trends and data in that area.

- In the Netherlands (2023), one of Europe's largest pirate IPTV services was taken down (over a million users, giving access to over 10 000 TV channels) ([Europol](#)). The Dutch fiscal police (FIOD) considered IPTV as an important development in 2024 providing it 'higher priority and more budget for combating illegal IPTV'⁽²¹⁾.
- In Greece (2023), the enforcement authorities dismantled an IPTV service that generated EUR 25 million profit while causing financial damage of EUR 10 million ([Greek Police](#)). In a joint decision of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance, and of Culture (2025), a procedure for imposing and collecting administrative fines was adopted allowing the responsible enforcement authorities (e.g. Independent Authority of Public Revenue, the General Directorate of the Financial Crime Prosecution Corps, the Interdepartmental Market Control Unit, Police, and Port and Customs Authorities) to fine end users of piracy services⁽²²⁾.
- In Spain (2024), enforcement authorities dismantled a major IPTV piracy network with over 14 000 users, giving access to over 130 television channels ([Policia Nacional](#)).
- In Italy (during the Euro 2024 football championship), enforcement actions resulted in over 1.3 million users losing access to pirated content ([Guardia di Finanza](#)). In 2025, Italian authorities cracked down on Italia TV (a pirate IPTV service), resulting in administrative fines being issued to over 2 200 of its subscribers ([TorrentFreak](#), [La Stampa](#)). A survey from [FAPAV/IPSOS](#) indicating a slight overall downward trend for users consuming pirated material

⁽²⁰⁾ According to the ARCOM [Report on streaming of illicit sports content](#), 1 769 IPTV services were blocked in 2024, compared to 77 in 2023.

⁽²¹⁾ See [BREIN jaarverslag 2024: Strijd tegen illegale IPTV in stroomversnelling](#), Spreekbuis.nl, 29 May 2025 (consulted on 15 July 2025).

⁽²²⁾ According to the [Joint Decision 358834](#), fines range from EUR 750 for regular consumer, to EUR 5 000 for users commercial in nature, with each additional violation increasing the fine.

in Italy, including for IPTV, but the level of piracy for live sports events remained the same (15 %) and the estimated losses increased by 23 % to EUR 350 million.

- In a coordinated operation with the support of [Europol](#) and Eurojust (2024), enforcement authorities in 15 countries dismantled a network of hundreds of illegal sports streaming providers that reached over 22 million users worldwide. Authorities seized 270 IPTV equipment and devices, at least 29 servers and took down 100 domains.

1.4. Additional information beyond KPIs: Overlap between digital content piracy and cybercrime

Under the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) ⁽²³⁾, digital content piracy is considered an IP crime, which can be interlinked to other criminal activities carried out by organised crime groups and networks. Digital content piracy is often enabled by traditional cybercriminal activities, or used as an enabler of cyberattacks of various kinds, and digital content piracy can be used to fund other criminal activities ⁽²⁴⁾. The Europol report specifically mentions that IPTV ‘has become increasingly popular’ ⁽²⁵⁾.

Through the operational actions taken in the EMPACT cycle, particularly the criminal investigations and prosecutions undertaken during the EMPACT cycle 2022-2025, digital content piracy, including live event piracy, seems to remain a significant criminal threat. It also seems to be increasingly committed by organised crime groups and networks, and less by ideologically driven individuals, based on the information from EUIPO’s interactions with European law enforcement and judiciary authorities.

⁽²³⁾ ‘EMPACT’ is the EU initiative driven by Member States to identify, prioritise and address threats posed by organised and serious international crime. It acts as a multidisciplinary cooperation platform, involving Member States, EU institutions and agencies (like Europol, Frontex and Eurojust), and other partners to combat these threats. See also [Europol](#).

⁽²⁴⁾ See also main findings of the report [Uncovering the ecosystem of Intellectual Property crime – A focus on enablers and impact](#), EUIPO-Europol, October 2024.

⁽²⁵⁾ Ibid, p. 26. See also [Σε ισχύ τσουχτερά πρόστιμα για να κλείσει η πληγή της πειρατείας](#) (in Greek – ‘Stinging fines to close the wound of piracy’), IRafina.gr, 6 August 2025 (consulted on 26 August 2025).

2. KPI 2 – PROMPT TREATMENT OF NOTICES RELATED TO UNAUTHORISED RETRANSMISSION OF LIVE SPORTS EVENTS AND OTHER LIVE EVENTS

Data provided by holders of rights ⁽²⁶⁾ and intermediaries ⁽²⁷⁾.

2.1. On notices

The KPIs refer to the first notices related to the unauthorised retransmission of a live event and submitted during this live event – addressed to online platforms, dedicated server providers (DSPs) or other providers of hosting services.

2.1.1. Notices submitted by holders of rights

Note: Some of the holders of rights have themselves introduced a new category – ‘other’. It included intermediaries, such as ‘CDNs’, ‘proxy’, ‘cloud’, but also ‘hosting service providers’, which may have not been identified as such by the holders of rights at the time of the notice.

Some of these intermediaries are not covered by the Digital Services Act’s (DSA) ⁽²⁸⁾ due diligence obligations for hosting providers (e.g. notice and action mechanisms). However, they have been addressed by the Recommendation (Point 6 and 7), suggesting they cooperate with holders of rights and hosting providers to facilitate the identification of the source of the unauthorised transmission. ⁽²⁹⁾

⁽²⁶⁾ KPI 2.1.1

⁽²⁷⁾ KPI 2.1.2

⁽²⁸⁾ [Regulation \(EU\) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC \(Digital Services Act\)](#).


⁽²⁹⁾ See also Box 1: The misuse of non-hosting providers in live event piracy.

2.1.1.1. On reported submission and treatment

The graphs below provide an overview of the notices sent by holders of rights to online platforms, DSPs or other providers of hosting services, and other services.

Graph 5: Number and percentage of notices sent by holders of rights (January 2024 to June 2025)

Total number of notices: **27 318 940**




- Further subcategorisation of ‘Other/Other hosting providers’⁽³⁰⁾: Intermediaries supporting the identification of the source of the unauthorised retransmission – **11 532 544** notices – 42 % of total notices.
- **1 546 011** notices – just under 6 % of total notices – were submitted on the basis of a cooperation agreement⁽³¹⁾. The suspension rate for such notices was 64 %.
- **3 105 072** notices – 11 % of total notices – resulted in suspension of the unauthorised retransmission. In the case of notices submitted to online platforms, the suspension rate was 96 %.

⁽³⁰⁾ Holders of rights used the categories ‘other’ and ‘other hosting providers’, and a differentiation was not possible. The number of 11 532 544 notices refers to notices sent to intermediaries such as ‘CDNs’, ‘proxy’, ‘cloud’, but also ‘hosting service providers’, which may not have been identified as such at the time of the notification, or because the intermediary offers services that could fall into several categories (‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ or ‘hosting’).

⁽³¹⁾ ‘Cooperation agreement’ refers to agreements between holders of rights and intermediaries supporting prompt submission of notices and their processing by using automated means (e.g. APIs).

Graph 6: Number and percentage of notices sent by holders of rights (January to December 2024)


Total number of notices: **12 119 384**



- Further subcategorisation of ‘Other/Other hosting providers’⁽³²⁾ – intermediaries supporting the identification of the source of the unauthorised retransmission – **3 405 652** notices – 28 % of total notices.
- 8 % of notices were submitted on the basis of a cooperation agreement.
- 19 % of notices – resulted in suspension of the unauthorised retransmission.

Graph 7: Number and percentage of notices sent by holders of rights (January to June 2025)

Total number of notices: **15 199 556**



- Further subcategorisation of ‘Other/Other hosting providers’⁽³³⁾ – intermediaries supporting the identification of the source of the unauthorised retransmission – **8 126 892** notices – 54 % of total notices. Of these intermediaries, reverse proxy providers received **7 368 168** notices – 49 % of total notices⁽³⁴⁾.
- 3 % of notices were submitted on the basis of a cooperation agreement.
- 5 % of notices – resulted in suspension of the unauthorised retransmission.

⁽³²⁾ Holders of rights used the categories ‘other’ and ‘other hosting providers’, and a differentiation was not possible. The number of 3 405 652 notices refers to notices sent to intermediaries such as ‘CDNs’, ‘proxy’, ‘cloud’, but also ‘hosting service providers’, which may have not been identified as such at the time of the notification, or because the intermediary offers services that could fall into several categories (‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ or ‘hosting’).

⁽³³⁾ Holders of rights used the categories ‘other’ and ‘other hosting providers’, and a differentiation was not possible. The number of 8 126 892 notices refers to notices sent to intermediaries such as ‘CDNs’, ‘proxy’, ‘cloud’, but also ‘hosting service providers’, which may have not been identified as such at the time of the notification, or because the intermediary offers services that could fall into several categories (‘mere conduit’, ‘caching’ or ‘hosting’).

⁽³⁴⁾ This was a new subcategory introduced by the holder of rights that reported a large increase in notices due to the implementation of new anti-piracy tools, which were launched in January 2025. See also section on ‘Fluctuations in data on notices between 2024 and first half of 2025’.

Fluctuations in data on notices between 2024 and first half of 2025

There are various factors to be considered when interpreting and comparing the data between the two collection periods, such as the different their length (12 months and 6 months), the number of participating stakeholders, or improved or intensified anti-piracy activities by data providers.

Due to the implementation of a new anti-piracy tool and strategy⁽³⁵⁾ by one of the sports event organisers, the total number of notices sent by holders of rights for the first half of 2025 (15 199 556 notices) is higher than the number of notices over the whole of 2024 (12 119 384 notices). This has a significant impact on the comparison of results.

For example, compared to 2024, the suspension rate of the illegal stream following a notice dropped from 19 % to 5 % in first half of 2025, but would have dropped considerably less without considering the data from the sports event organiser in question. There was a drop in the number of notices submitted on the basis of a cooperation agreement from 8 % in 2024 to 3 % in first half of 2025, which would be even lower had the data from the sports event organiser not been considered.

Additional information beyond KPIs: the Grant Thornton report

The Sports Rights Owner Coalition (SROC) and the Live Content Coalition commissioned three reports⁽³⁶⁾ on the treatment of notices related to unauthorised retransmissions in parallel to the monitoring of the Recommendation. The Grant Thornton report complements the monitoring exercise as the data largely corresponds to results presented in this document⁽³⁷⁾. According to the final report, 26.2 million unauthorised retransmissions were detected between January 2024 and June 2025, and 89 % of them were not suspended after being notified by holders of rights. Intermediaries reportedly took limited action – 6 % of notices were addressed within 30 minutes, and for 21 % of them it took over two hours. Most notices, 49 %, were sent to ‘Other/Other hosting providers’. DSPs received 46 % of the notices, and 91 % of them were not suspended (in comparison to only 2 % not suspended by online platforms). The final report focused on the key developments over the monitoring period, observing a negative trend – ‘an increase in the number of notices issued and a decrease in the percentage of those resulting in suspension’. It also showed a positive effect of cooperation agreements, notably a higher suspension rate when notices were submitted based such agreements (around 75 % resulted in suspension). It notes that only 5 % of notices were sent on the basis of a cooperation agreement, and the majority of those were to online platforms.

Additional information beyond KPIs: ‘Raw Data’

‘Raw Data’ provided by some holders of rights seems to indicate that a relatively low number of IP addresses cumulated a significant number of notices. For example, slightly over 100 of the IP addresses targeted by notices received almost 50 % of the notices. The data contained from the ‘Raw Data’ submission is not representative for the entire ecosystem and no conclusion can be drawn, but it may serve as a complementary orientation to the information obtained from the aggregated data. The ‘Raw Data’ also showed multiple (up to a few hundred) notices sent at a given moment to the same intermediary. According to the holders of rights, these were not duplicated notices but occurred when ‘a website hosted several streams’.

⁽³⁵⁾ The new tools that reportedly allow the holder of rights to monitor a broader and more diverse range of piracy sources. The sports events organiser also expanded access to piracy and intelligence data worldwide and increased its anti-piracy team.

⁽³⁶⁾ Based on data from 10 data providers, including major sports leagues and broadcasters, which also participated in the KPI exercise. See also Grant Thornton:

[The impact of the European Commission’s Recommendation on combating online piracy of live events](#), (November 2024); [The European Commission Recommendation on combatting online piracy of live events has limited impact after 17 month](#) (February 2025); [Two Years On: Online Piracy Trends Worsen Despite the European Commission’s Recommendation](#) (August 2025).

⁽³⁷⁾ The data for the monitoring exercise was provided by more holders of rights.

2.1.1.2. On measures put in place to ensure accuracy of notices

To ensure that the notices sent were accurate, a sports event organiser mentioned the use of screenshots and timestamps. One organiser mentioned human verification as a measure and that notices were sent to email addresses referred to in IP and ASN databases⁽³⁸⁾. One broadcaster mentioned verifying content by video recognition technology and manual identification. Three holders of rights also ensured the verification of the media rights or territories before submitting the notices. One broadcaster mentioned that their enforcement vendor used whitelists and only sent notices to intermediaries that were hosting infringing streams. If a site appeared official or was from another holder of rights, the enforcement vendor would confirm with the broadcaster whether to proceed with the notice.

2.1.2. Notices received by intermediaries

No intermediary submitted KPIs on the notices received during the data collection period, except for the testing period⁽³⁹⁾. Some information was submitted in further exchanges with the EUIPO.

Box 1: The misuse of non-hosting providers in live event piracy

The Recommendation addresses non-hosting providers, such as content delivery networks (CDNs) and reverse proxy/pass-through security services, in the context of 'Cooperation with intermediaries that can support the identification of the source of the unauthorised retransmission' (KPI 2.2.1). However, some holders of rights and national authorities consider the misuse of services provided by these intermediaries – notably CDNs and reverse proxy/pass-through security services, virtual private networks (VPNs) and alternative domain name system (DNS) services – by IP infringers as an important element facilitating live event piracy. They see the need to address this issue at EU level.

In the context of the dedicated network, two national authorities reported that 80-90 % of the piracy cases they deal with relate to content delivered via the services of one major intermediary, which also provides CDN and reverse proxy/pass-through security services. In bilateral meetings, holders of rights also confirmed that CDNs were intermediaries whose services were often misused for live event piracy retransmissions. One holder of rights addressed the intermediary as 'easily exploited' by pirates to conceal their true hosts.

Holders of rights reportedly contacted them as a measure to counter the illegal transmission of live events, with mixed results depending on the intermediary. According to a broadcaster, one intermediary responded by referring to its 'technical role as a mere conduit of illicit transmission' and providing the email address 'of the competent hosting provider for any reports'. The intermediary, however, underlined that it cooperates with holders of rights through a trusted reporting initiative, which grants members access to pirate site IP addresses. In the case of a different intermediary providing similar services, an organiser of sport events reported on a positive cooperation.

⁽³⁸⁾ RIPE, ARIN and LACNIC.

⁽³⁹⁾ During the testing phase, one intermediary reported of 856 received notices, but could not state whether this happened during the live event. Out of these, 8 % (65 notices) were not acted upon as they were considered incomplete and 90 % (773 notices) as they were considered unsubstantiated, making reference to a court case without further clarification. No data was provided for notices that were fraudulent or abusive. The median time to take action based on a notice was 15 minutes and the process was automatized. Although notices were checked for their validity and authenticity, 83 complaints related to the blocking of live content were received and 11 % resulted in the unblocking.

Another issue highlighted within the dedicated network is the use of VPN and DNS services to hide the origin of the infringers or to circumvent blocking measures. According to a report from the national authority ARCOM⁽⁴⁰⁾, 35 % of French internet users make use of VPN or alternative DNS services, and 66 % of those involved in illegal practices are using either a VPN or alternative DNS services. Taking this into account, ARCOM recommends the collaboration with VPN providers and DNS actors and to reinforce blocking measures⁽⁴¹⁾.

Additional information beyond KPIs: According to one organisation representing holders of rights, an intermediary providing search engine services updated its policies and was no longer using ads for the search term 'IPTV'⁽⁴²⁾.

2.2. On Cooperation agreements

The KPIs refer to data on the existence, use and efficiency of different cooperation agreements⁽⁴³⁾ in place for the submission of notices and the identification of the source of the illegal content.

In 2024, 11 holders of rights mentioned existing cooperation agreements. Around 1 million notices (8 % of all notices) were sent through 49 cooperation agreements. Of the approximate 1 million notices, 55 % led to a suspension. The parties of the cooperation agreements were intermediaries: 25 with DSPs, 17 with online platforms and 7 'other'⁽⁴⁴⁾. Two broadcasters mentioned agreements between their vendor and an online platform without providing more information. Those holders of rights who reported on the effectiveness of existing cooperation agreements (KPI. 2.2.1) mentioned that they were effective in blocking the stream or removing content (e.g. in under 10 minutes), and that they provide access to special tools (e.g. APIs) that are useful in managing large volumes of takedown notices. However, one sports event organiser lamented the lack of automation tools, technology, procedures and APIs, as well as the implementation of Know-Your-Customer policies.

In the first half of 2025, 12 holders of rights mentioned existing cooperation agreements. Almost 500 000 (3 % of all notices) were sent through 62 cooperation agreements. Of the approximate 500 000 notices, 87 % led to a suspension. The parties of the cooperation agreements were intermediaries: 42 with DSPs, 18 with online platforms and 2 'other'⁽⁴⁵⁾. Two broadcasters mentioned agreements between their vendor and an online platform without providing more information. Those holders of rights who reported on the effectiveness of existing cooperation agreements (KPI. 2.2.1) mentioned that they were effective in blocking the stream or removing the content (e.g. in under 10 minutes). However, one sports event organiser lamented the lack of automation tools, technology, procedures and APIs, as well as the implementation of Know-Your-Customer policies.

One holder of rights (broadcaster) sent notices on the basis of the DSA 'trusted flagger' mechanism. Two holders of rights mentioned cooperation agreements with providers of payment or advertising services (KPI 2.3.1.) – one sports event organiser with a voluntary cooperation agreement, one broadcaster with an industry-led follow-the-money initiative.

⁽⁴⁰⁾ See [Usage des outils de sécurisation d'Internet](#), ARCOM, April 2024.

⁽⁴¹⁾ See [Lutte contre le piratage de contenus sportifs et culturels - Bilan 2023](#), ARCOM, 30 April 2024.

⁽⁴²⁾ See [BREIN Annual report 2024](#), 28 May 2025.

⁽⁴³⁾ KPI 2.1.1., KPI 2.2.1. and KPI 2.3.1.

⁽⁴⁴⁾ Of which the following were further specified: two cloud service providers, two other hosting providers, three CDN and proxy service providers.

⁽⁴⁵⁾ With an intermediary that can help identifying the source.

Two intermediaries submitted information during the data collection: one DSP during the testing phase⁽⁴⁶⁾ and one intermediary providing CDN services for the first half of 2025. The latter reportedly supported collaborative efforts ‘that do not impinge on the right of millions of Europeans to browse the Internet’. It has in place a trusted user programme with over 200 participating rights-holder organisations, and over 90 of them making use of the API abuse reporting form. These organisations get access to the origin IP address of a website and information about the website’s hosting provider. However, one broadcaster stated that the online form to identify the hosting provider – presumably without a cooperation agreement – does not disclose the IP address, which ‘is an obstacle to efficient enforcement and gathering data within OSINT to determine the identity of the pirate’.

One organisation representing holders of rights in Poland explained that collaboration with platforms happened mainly through by ‘non-automated model, which covered 88 % of reports’, according to their survey.

⁽⁴⁶⁾ During the testing phase, the intermediary used the KPI template and noted five cooperation agreements in place that support the prompt submission of notices. However, it claimed that none of the notices were submitted on the basis of a cooperation agreement due to the ‘zero tolerance policy towards streaming of [illegal] live events’, for which no further clarification was given.

3. KPI 3 – USE OF (DYNAMIC) INJUNCTIONS FOR LIVE EVENTS

Data provided by national authorities⁽⁴⁷⁾ and holders of rights⁽⁴⁸⁾. One intermediary provided data outside the KPIs (see section: *Additional information beyond KPIs – on safeguards and over blocking*).

3.1. Member States

The KPI refers to data regarding the legal standing granted to sports event organisers. The KPI also requests the number of dynamic injunctions granted by a judicial or administrative authority to block the unauthorised retransmission of a live event, and the number of domains or IP addresses blocked as a result.

Injunctions

Table 1: Number of dynamic injunctions granted by authorities

January to December 2024	January to June 2025
6 national authorities reported with quantitative data on the number of injunctions granted by authorities.	7 national authorities reported with quantitative data on the number of injunctions granted by authorities.
2 387 injunctions granted by authorities in these Member States resulted in 41 720 blocked domains/IP addresses.	579 injunctions granted by authorities in these Member States resulted in 35 542 blocked domains/IP addresses.

In some Member States, national authorities did not report on dynamic injunctions due to a lack of information (e.g. the orders were issued by a court and the national authority did not monitor the decisions or take part in the implementation) or the dynamic injunctions issued by the national authority were not applied to live events due to procedural timeframes and the requirement for judicial authorisation.

The addressed intermediaries of the reported orders were referred to as ‘internet service providers’ or more specifically ‘internet access providers’ (IAPs). Some national authorities additionally specified hosting providers (for removing infringing content and requesting information about the infringer), search engines (e.g. for demoting search results and ads services – including through voluntary agreements), DNS proxy providers⁽⁴⁹⁾, VPN providers, advertising services and financial services providers.

Additional information beyond KPIs: The use of dynamic injunctions addressing live event piracy was mentioned by 13 Member States⁽⁵⁰⁾, although they may be available in more jurisdictions. In six of these Member States, the national authority can issue injunctions or support the implementation of a court injunctions, such as by updating the list of internet locations

According to a 2025 report from the French national authority ARCOM⁽⁵¹⁾, 71 % of users stopped pursuing their attempts at illegal viewing of sports content after the infringing streaming sites have been

⁽⁴⁷⁾ KPI 3.1.

⁽⁴⁸⁾ KPI 3.3.

⁽⁴⁹⁾ Blocking orders targeting VPN or DNS resolvers were issued in three Member States. For the first half of 2025, one of them reported on 3 court decisions targeting VPNs to block 245 DN, and 5 court decisions requesting a search engine to de-reference 70 DN.

⁽⁵⁰⁾ This data is not exhaustive and is based on information provided by some national authorities outside the KPI monitoring exercise.

⁽⁵¹⁾ See [Report on streaming of illicit sports content, ARCOM, 14 May 2025](#).

blocked. In Italy, piracy rates in general – not only for live events – decreased over the years, with almost half of the users converting to legal sources after reaching a blocked site, according to a survey⁽⁵²⁾.

Safeguards

- Two national authorities reported instances of wrongful or over blocking – five cases were noted for one Member State in 2024 and two for the other in first half of 2025.
- From the received data, it was not possible to assess the extent and long-term effects of each case of over blocking.
- National authorities, including judicial authorities, may have several levels of evidence reviews in place.
- Automated systems related to blocking measures were mentioned by the following national authorities: Greece, France, Italy, Lithuania and Portugal, with Belgium planning one.
- One national authority mentioned preliminary injunctions, where the defendant was given an opportunity to respond before the injunction was issued. If the injunction was ‘ex-parte’ due to the risk of damage had the decision been delayed, the plaintiff had to deposit a security with the court for the potential damages.
- All KPIs that included data on the safeguards mentioned that courts and administrative authorities considered fundamental rights to ensure the proportionality of the injunction, for example when deciding on the duration. The decisions were reported to be taken on a case-by-case basis, and may be legally challenged.
- In some cases, blocking measures were applied to the duration of the event (‘live injunctions’).
- To safeguard the proportionality of the injunction, some national authorities specifically mentioned timely unblocking in case of error or if the infringement had been remedied. In one Member State, the law requires ‘internet service providers’ to unblock within five working days, but in practice the use of an automated platform allows for unblocking of DNS to be achieved within one hour (for IP addresses it may take longer). Another national authority stated that holders of rights can request the immediate unblocking in case of error and can report resources that are predominantly (no longer unequivocally) intended for illegal activities.
- One Member State mentioned that holders of rights provide information when requesting a blocking order ‘under their own responsibility’ and in another, the applicant can be held (fully) liable in court proceedings.
- In cases of automatised processing, the responsibility of the applicant to provide evidence and technical safeguards to reduce error were reported, including the use of whitelists containing addresses that should not be blocked. In several mentions, reviews of complaints take place at the instance that issued the authorisation for blocking, such as the court, or the national authority responsible for the blocking.
- Users were generally informed about the reasons for the blocking, for example by redirecting to an informative URL, and were given information about legal offer, such as a link to national portals or Agorateka.
- Some national authorities also addressed the subscriber to combat illegal sharing of content protected by copyright. One national authority first makes use of a ‘prevention measure’ to raise awareness and, if unsuccessful, continues with a pre-penal phase that may lead to referral to the public prosecutor. Another national authority can target consumers illegally downloading copyrighted content. In the third Member State, the enforcement authorities (other than the national authority addressed by the KPI) may fine end users of illegal streaming services⁽⁵³⁾.
- National authorities also reported on (draft) legislative changes, for example on the improvement of administrative procedures, enlarged scope of dynamic injunctions or increased inter-ministerial coordination ahead of legislative proposals to address (live event) piracy.

⁽⁵²⁾ See [Sports Piracy Damages Soar in Italy Despite ‘Piracy Shield’ Blocking Efforts](#), TorrentFreak, 21 June 2025 (consulted on 25 August 2025).

⁽⁵³⁾ See section 1.3. *Additional information beyond KPIs: Enforcement activities*.

Additional information beyond KPIs – on safeguards and over blocking:

Based on the EUIPO Observatory's internal research, infringing website lists (IWLs) were made publicly available in 10 Member States⁽⁵⁴⁾, which can be consulted by other stakeholders, including national authorities. National authorities in five Member States were feeding the information further into the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Alert database⁽⁵⁵⁾.

The intermediary participating in the monitoring exercise⁽⁵⁶⁾, whose IP address was affected by a (dynamic) blocking decision from a Member State's court, claimed in a written contribution to the EUIPO that at least 14 586 domains were affected as collateral damage⁽⁵⁷⁾.

According to a report from the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), DNS blocking orders should have a defined scope to avoid unwanted effects. For example, addressed at 'internet service providers', DNS blocking orders have a lower impact in case of over blocking as they cater a clearly defined group of users, compared a than those addressed at public resolvers that may have users at global scale⁽⁵⁸⁾.

Legal standing

Note: The EUIPO Observatory used information on legal standing for sports event organisers from different sources. Based on the plurality of answers received by the national authorities, it was challenging to achieve a meaningful classification of Member States' legal regimes regarding legal standing.

Sports event as such are not protected by copyright as they do not qualify as work, for lack of free and creative choice (originality threshold)⁽⁵⁹⁾. However, sports events organisers may benefit from the following protection:

- rights related for the recording and broadcast of sports events (for producers of audiovisual works and for broadcasting organisations);
- domiciliary rights ('House rights') – a form of property rights – that allow the owner, tenant of the venue where the sports event takes place (stadium), to claim exclusive rights to use and regulate access into the sports venue (including to take legal actions for instance against those who record the sports event without prior authorisation).

⁽⁵⁴⁾ [Belgium](#), Denmark, [France](#), [Germany](#), [Greece](#), [Italy](#), [Latvia](#), [Lithuania](#), [the Netherlands](#) and [Spain](#).

⁽⁵⁵⁾ Belgium, Greece, Italy, Lithuania and Spain. [WIPO ALERT](#) is an online platform to which authorised bodies of member states in the World Intellectual Property Organization can upload details of websites or apps that have been determined to infringe copyright according to national rules. Advertisers, advertising agencies and their technical service providers can apply to become authorised users of WIPO ALERT to access aggregated lists of infringing websites.

⁽⁵⁶⁾ The intermediary provides different services, including as content delivery network.

⁽⁵⁷⁾ In bilateral meetings and in external sources, some intermediaries mentioned over blocking occurrences, such as in a contribution to European Commission [Call for Evidence on Combating online piracy of sports and other live events – assessment of the May 2023 Commission Recommendation](#).

⁽⁵⁸⁾ See [SAC127 DNS Blocking Revisited](#), ICANN, 15 May 2025. See also [ICANN's DNS Blocking Report Presents Three Key Recommendations](#), TorrentFreak, 9 June 2025.

⁽⁵⁹⁾ See [Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08](#).

In addition, in some Member States there are national schemes protecting sports events. These are mainly in form of related rights or other similar form of protection, and exist in France (exploitation right), in Italy (audiovisual sports right), but also Spain (audiovisual right for sports event and the sports competition organiser). Greece introduced in 2025 an explicit legal standing for sports event organisers.

Box 2: The dedicated network of national authorities

In line with the European Commission's Recommendation, the Observatory established a dedicated network of administrative authorities ('dedicated network') to regularly exchange information on the measures and good practices used to address the issues covered in the Recommendation and the challenges encountered. The information obtained from the exchanges during the meetings and bilaterally provided an important input to this document.

The dedicated network met four times during the monitoring period: first meeting ([9-10 October 2023](#), back-to-back with the first Conference on live event piracy), second ([11 June 2024](#)), third ([2-3 December 2024](#)), fourth meeting ([29 and 30 April 2025](#), back-to-back with the second Conference on live event piracy) meeting, and the online technical workshop (24 September 2024). The meetings recorded a high participation from Member States.

The dedicated network had a high satisfaction rate by national authorities and contributed to their general understanding of the specificities of live event piracy, particularly in the cross-border context. Topics such as new developments and current piracy issues, the implementation of (dynamic) blocking injunctions, measures to avoid over blocking, the use of whitelists or blacklists and the issues with intermediaries that support the identification of sources (non-hosting intermediaries) raised most interest.

Since the first meeting of the dedicated network, there have been several positive developments at national level (e.g. the re-establishment of an interdepartmental anti-piracy team in one Member State, with the aim to work out the details of live/dynamic/web blocking procedures; inter-ministerial meetings on live event piracy in another).

The last meeting in the context of the Recommendation is scheduled for 20 November 2025. The national authorities have shown interest in maintaining the dedicated network and to cover topics on combating online piracy in general. The EUIPO intends to maintain the dedicated network possibly with a wider mandate on combating online piracy in general.

3.2. Holders of rights

The KPI referred to the requests for a court or administrative injunction, the results of the requests and additional information related to the use of blocking injunctions.

Table 2: Number of injunctions requested by holders of rights

January to December 2024	January to June 2025
8 holders of rights requested 2 520 orders and 86% were granted.	8 holders of rights requested 1 750 orders and 90% were granted.

De-indexing injunctions for providers of online search engines were also obtained (see also footnote 49).

Challenges to obtain dynamic injunctions

- Some broadcasters reported difficulties in obtaining dynamic injunctions in certain Member States. In one case, a broadcaster explained that the court did not recognise the ‘immediate danger’ posed by the unauthorised retransmission. The broadcaster also explained that the courts were generally reluctant to issue dynamic decisions, referring to the lack of applicable rules in this regard and overall unclear interpretation of the national law. One broadcaster tried to obtain a dynamic injunction for another Member State based on a list of illicit websites that had previously hosted pirated streams of a sports event organiser. However, the court dismissed the request referring to the national law ‘stipulates that the decisive factor for the court decision is the situation at the time of its pronouncement, and that the court must decide on the basis of the established facts of the case’ (quote by the broadcaster).
- Some holders of rights lamented long administrative procedures and called for (near) real-time verification of blocking requests due to the use of advanced blocking circumvention measures by pirate services (for web-streaming and IPTV).
- For one Member State, holders of rights mentioned discussions with the national authority and ‘internet service providers’ to implement live dynamic IP blocking measures.

Reported measures to facilitate the existing blocking procedures

- One sports event organiser mentioned the use of a software tool to ensure accuracy of requests. One mentioned the use of AI-powered tools for to minimise the risk of blocking third-party content.
- Another explained that they manually reviewed the URLs and IP addresses to avoid over blocking, and that the legal teams from providers of intermediary services also reviewed the request.
- One broadcaster mentioned whitelists being used to avoid possible wrongful or over blocking.
- One sports event organiser mentioned a voluntary initiative with ‘internet service providers’ to exchange the infringing IP address to be blocked through an API in real time without any limitations in terms of volume. Another agreement limited the maximum number of 250 URLs and IP addresses per request through designated email addresses.
- One broadcaster confirmed that the implementation of updates of DNS blocking measures by providers of intermediary services was accelerated in one Member State due to an automated procedure provided by the national authority.
- Three holders of rights mentioned a voluntary initiative or standard agreement launched by a national authority between representatives of holders of rights (live sports event) and of ‘internet service providers’. The aim was to accelerate the blocking measures scheme, and to share the costs among the signatories. Its main limitation was that the list of services subject to updated blocking measures could not be shared with intermediaries not mentioned in the court order.

4. KPI 4 – AVAILABILITY, AFFORDABILITY, ATTRACTIVENESS AND AWARENESS OF LEGAL OFFER

Data provided by holders of rights⁽⁶⁰⁾ and national authorities⁽⁶¹⁾.

Note: KPI 4 refers to the availability and affordability of legal offers as well as measures taken to increase awareness, or obstacles faced. The likely impact of accessibility and availability of competitively priced legal offers on piracy was mentioned in multiple reports⁽⁶²⁾, including the EUIPO IP Perception study in 2023⁽⁶³⁾. In addition, a recent Europol report⁽⁶⁴⁾ and a survey of the United Kingdom’s Intellectual Property Office⁽⁶⁵⁾ stated that the economic situation and the fragmentation of content were an important driver of piracy.

On various occasions (bilateral meetings, conferences), some holders or rights mentioned the efforts made to increase the availability of legal offers, referred to the inherent costs of organising competitions and did not necessarily concur with the link between availability and affordability of legal offer on the one hand, and live event piracy on the other. They referred to the latest EUIPO report on ‘Online copyright infringement in the European Union’⁽⁶⁶⁾, which used an econometric model for live sports events piracy that indicates ‘a positive association with GDP per capita’, meaning that countries with a higher GDP may experience a higher level of piracy. The report, however, provides possible answers to such unexpected indication, including higher prices, high youth unemployment rate and more reluctance to add more specific subscriptions⁽⁶⁷⁾.

4.1. Holders of rights

For a representative sample of sports and other live events, which should address different audiences and territories, holders of rights were invited to provide information on the number and type of distribution channels in each Member States, in which such events were available (free-to-air TV, Pay TV, streaming services, subscription / pay-per-view, etc.).

The submitted data referred only to sports. Both broadcasters and sports event organisers covered sports such as football, tennis, golf, rugby, basketball and motorsports from January 2024 to June 2025.

Sports event organisers replied through their association. Their data referred to the type of sports, territory level (EU Member States) and licensing to broadcasters (and platforms), which were mostly subscription-based. According to the submitters’ explanation during the testing phase, they do not

⁽⁶⁰⁾ KPI 4.1.

⁽⁶¹⁾ KPI 4.2.

⁽⁶²⁾ See Intellectual Property Crime Threat Assessment, EUIPO and Europol, March 2022.

⁽⁶³⁾ 26 % of respondents across the EU declared it acceptable to obtain online pirated content when there is no immediately available legal alternative. See [IP Perception Study 2023](#), EUIPO 2023.

⁽⁶⁴⁾ See report on [EU Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2025 \(EU-SOCTA\)](#), Europol, May 2025.

⁽⁶⁵⁾ ‘A main driver of illegal content access is the perception of unfair or high pricing for legal services, especially when multiple subscriptions are required for full access. Younger respondents are more likely to turn to illegal sources due to these financial motivations’. See [Online Copyright Infringement \(OCI\) 2024 – Main findings report](#), UK Intellectual Property Office, 2024.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ See [Online copyright infringement in the European Union – films, music, publications, software and TV \(2017-2023\)](#), EUIPO November 2024.

⁽⁶⁷⁾ Ibid. See p. 13: ‘For live sports events piracy, the [econometric] model indicates that it has a positive association with GDP per capita. This is counterintuitive because populations with higher incomes should be able to pay for legitimate service. Some possible hypotheses that could explain this are: i) relative lower offer in countries with a smaller GDP per capita that would lead to little interest, ii) high demand in richer countries that push prices up which could be dissuasive for a significant proportion of the population, especially if income is unequally distributed, and iii) users in rich countries may have already moved to subscription based products for music, films and TV and may be reluctant to add more subscriptions. A high youth unemployment rate is also associated with higher piracy. Finally, an increase in the share of internet users, as well as a higher number of TV channels are associated with a reduction in piracy.’

generally monitor the distribution chain past the first level of licensing, so no further information was provided. Information on indicative prices for access to the content was not included. This was due to commercial sensitivity concerns and because the pricing of their sports content, which was often bundled with other type of content, were set by broadcasters.

As a measure to raise awareness, the association also referred to their website '[Where to watch](#)', indicating legal offers by broadcasters in Member States. One sports event organiser specifically referred to its website indicating the licensed broadcasters. The association also explained that it was difficult to provide a list of indicative prices for access to content due to commercial considerations and how sports rights were commercialised by broadcasters further down the value chain.

Table 3: Overview of sports event organisers' distribution chain per sport

Sports	Countries	Number of different competitions per Member State	Number of licenced broadcasters per Member State
Football	EU-27	9-11	1-5
Tennis	EU-27	6	1-3
Golf	EU-27	2-4	1-2
Rugby*	EU-24	3	1-2
Basketball	EU-27	3	1-3
Moto GP	EU-27	1-2	1-3

* Rugby was reported for 24 Member States.

Only a few sports competitions were reported as licenced to a public broadcaster. However, it is not clear whether the entire competition was aired through a public broadcaster, or just specific matches.

Overall, the representative sample of sports event organisers included 701 broadcasted competitions in 27 Member States. The majority were licenced to one broadcaster (65 % of all competitions) or two broadcasters (30 % of all competitions).

Five broadcasters provided data on the number of licenses and type of distribution channels for volleyball, boxing, handball, basketball, motorsports, tennis, hockey, rugby, futsal and football for their respective territories (in five Member States). The broadcasted events were national, European, regional and world championships.

The granularity of reported events by broadcasters was on the level of 'competitions' with one broadcaster exceptionally listing 'individual games'. The number of licenses within its reported territory of the broadcaster were usually between one to two per event. The number of distribution channels mostly varied between one and two per event, and all of them offered content via Pay TV or streaming services based on subscriptions.

For information on the initiatives to raise users' awareness on the availability of legal offers, two broadcasters mentioned the use of advertisements and marketing activities.

Additional information beyond KPIs – on raising awareness:

In September 2023, a group of sports event organisers and broadcasters launched an awareness campaign in Ireland and the United Kingdom – [BeStreamWise](#) – on the dangers of illegal streaming. The warning referred to the fact that the piracy services were part of criminal networks and that users may become victim to cybercriminals themselves ⁽⁶⁸⁾.

⁽⁶⁸⁾ [Warning over dangers of illegal streaming](#), RTE, 15 November 2023 (consulted on 25 August 2025).

4.2. Member States

National authorities provided information on initiatives raising awareness and on users facing possible obstacles to access legal offers.

References to legal offers were mentioned for national websites or portals in several Member States, and specifically for Agorateka, blacklists⁽⁶⁹⁾ of illegal and whitelists of legal offers. Awareness measures included ads and banners, or as part of the information left on the website being blocked. Events were also used to raise awareness and one authority organised a conference with stakeholders on the competences and new procedure of the created body.

Bulgaria joined Agorateka in June 2024, by Slovenia in October and Croatia in November 2025. The platform, helps consumers identify legal offers, including for sports content. For more information on the list of countries members to Agorateka, please consult Annex II.

Other initiatives included video ads, campaigns against piracy – including directed at sports piracy – organised by national authorities, holders of rights or by intermediaries. Furthermore, publishing of studies (e.g. from the EUIPO) and related news on the authorities' website, educational training programmes (e.g. a copyright school), school curricula, seminars and scientific events.

Among the obstacles to access legal offers, national authorities mentioned the price of legal content (for subscription and purchase costs, particularly if legal offer was available as a higher priced package by broadcasters), fragmentation of legal offer (not all was available in one place and several subscriptions are required), limited variety of content, territoriality (not available in the consumer's Member State). Low awareness of the importance of protection IP rights, on financial damages caused, and lack of awareness of legal sources (except during the launch period of the new service), and confusion among users about the legality or illegality of the websites were also mentioned. In one case, the merger of two providers and the resulting technical issues was reported as obstacle. One national authority stated that 60 % of users on its territory combine legal and illegal consumption.

Some national authorities did not have information on the obstacles to access legal offers.

⁽⁶⁹⁾ See also footnote 54 on IWLs that were not reported via the KPIs.

5. ANNEXES

Annex I – Abbreviations and Glossary

ABBREVIATIONS

- **API** – application programming interface
- **CDN** – content delivery network
- **DSP** – dedicated server provider
- **IAP** – internet access provider
- **IPTV** – internet protocol television
- **KPI** – key performance indicator
- **VPN** – virtual private network

GLOSSARY

- **Cooperation agreement** – agreements between holders of rights and providers of hosting services supporting prompt submission of notices and their processing by using automated means (e.g. APIs).
- **Notice** – the first notice related to the unauthorised retransmission of a live event and submitted during this live event – addressed to online platforms/DSPs/other providers of hosting services.
- **Suspension** – the suspension of the unauthorised retransmission of live event before the end of the authorised retransmission.

Annex II – List of countries that joined the Agorateka network

Agorateka is an online content portal developed by the EUIPO through the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights, which helps consumers identify legal offers for music, television and films, games, books and sports events.

Currently, the Agorateka network covers 25 EU countries. 17 of these countries have created a national portal. Bulgaria joined in June 2024, Slovenia in October and Croatia in November 2025. The countries that have not yet joined the network are Luxembourg and Malta.

Country	Date joining	National portal
Austria	March 2017	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Belgium	March 2017	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Bulgaria	June 2024	ArtClick *
Croatia	November 2025	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Czech Republic	October 2017	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Cyprus	October 2020	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Denmark	June 2017	Share with Care (SWC)
Estonia	May 2021	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Finland	October 2017	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
France	November 2016	Arcom CNC
Germany	Sep 2021	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Greece	August 2019	Enjoy Legal
Hungary	March 2020	Hungaroteka * Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Ireland	May 2020	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Italy	May 2017	Mappa dei Contenuti
Latvia	November 2016	Nem Drosi * Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Lithuania	June 2017	Naudok legaliai *
Netherlands	August 2018	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Poland	October 2017	Legalna Kultura
Portugal	October 2016	Ofertas Legais *
Romania	December 2020	agorateka Romanian
Slovakia	July 2018	agorateka Slovakia * Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Slovenia	October 2025	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Spain	March 2017	Several sectorial platforms (see Agorateka)
Sweden	April 2018	Streamalagligt *

*based on the Agorateka toolkit